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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Sonny Charles Rome appeals from his conviction for burglary and the 
imposition of a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Rome with a single count of aiding and abetting a 
burglary, later amended to include a sentencing enhancement for being a 
persistent violator. (R., pp. 48-49, 76-77.) Rome filed a motion to dismiss, 
contending the burglary statute was "unconstitutional on its face." (R., pp. 59-
66.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p. 69.) 
After a trial a jury found Rome guilty of both the burglary charge and the 
enhancement. (R., pp. 110-11.) The district court entered judgment, from which 
Rome filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 179, 182.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Rome states the issues on appeal as: 
L Whether Idaho's Burglary statute violates equal protection as 
applied by irrationally punishing people who enter spaces 
surrounded by walls a ceiling more harshly that those that do 
not. 
II. Whether Idaho's Burglary statute, by requiring that a person 
convicted of the crime be made a felon, imposes cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
Ill. Whether Idaho's Burglary statute as applied violates the First 
Amendment by criminalizing thought. 
IV. Whether the general rule announced in State v. Brandt, 110 
Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 1986), is a mechanical rule determined 
by the existence or non-existence of certain factors or 
whether the general rule applies wherever the circumstances 
of the alleged prior convictions show that the defendant had 
no notice and thus no opportunity to change his conduct 
between acts. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4 (verbatim).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Rome failed to show any constitutional infirmity in the burglary 
statute? 
2. Has Rome failed to show that the enhancement for being a persistent 




The District Court Correctly Concluded Rome Was Not Entitled To Dismissal 
Based On Rome's Assertion That The Burglary Statute Violates The First 
Amendment And The Equal Protection Clause 
A Introduction 
Rome claims, as he did below, that Idaho's burglary statute is 
unconstitutional because, according to Rome, it violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, and violates the First 
Amendment. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-21. 1) Rome's constitutional arguments lack 
merit because Idaho's burglary statute does not implicate, let alone violate, the 
Equal Protection Clause, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, 
or free speech rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute. kt The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 
that upholds its constitutionality. kt 
1 Identical issues are raised in State v. Rawlings, Docket No. 42697, currently 
scheduled for oral argument before the Idaho Supreme Court on December 9, 
2015. 
3 
The Burglary Statute Does Not Violate The Equal Protection Clause Or 
The First Amendment 
Idaho's burglary statute reads: 
Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, 
tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or 
other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane or railroad car, 
with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary. 
I.C. § 18-1401. 
Rome contends the burglary statute violates the Equal Protection Clause 
and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 6-21.) Both of Rome's arguments fail. 
1. Idaho's Burglary Statute Does Not Violate The Equal Protection Clause 
Or The Prohibition Against Cruel And Unusual Punishment 
'"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike."' State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006, 
1015 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). '"Equal protection issues focus on classifications within 
statutory schemes that allocate benefits or burdens differently among the 
categories of persons affected."' Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 316, 324 P.3 at 1015 
(quoting In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho 157, 160, 106 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2005)). 
When evaluating a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court engages 
in a three-step analysis: first, the Court must "identify the classification that is 
being challenged"; second, the Court "determine[s] the standard under which the 
4 
classification be judicially reviewed"; and third, the Court must "decide 
whether the appropriate standard has been satisfied." "Therefore, in 
[Rome] to prevail [on his Equal Protection claim,] he would be required to show 
that he, by virtue of some classification, is being treated differently than a person 
who does not share that classification." Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 316, 324 P.3d at 
1015. 
Idaho's burglary statute does not create any classifications. The statute 
applies to "every person" who enters an enumerated place "with intent to commit 
any theft or any felony." I.C. § 18-1401. In other words, the statute treats all 
individuals the same. As such, Rome "cannot legitimately assert that the State is 
treating him differently on account of any classification." Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 
316, 324 P.3d at 1015. Rome claims otherwise, arguing the burglary statute 
"separate[s] those like [himself] intending a theft at the moment they enter an 
enclosed structure, even though no trespass occurs, from those who intend a 
theft one moment after trespassing within, or who intend prior to entry, decide 
against the theft, but after entering, change their mind again." (Appellant's brief, 
p. 8.) This argument is specious. The classification Rome articulates is based 
on those who commit burglary as defined by the legislature being treated 
differently than those who do not. All criminal statutes prohibit individuals from 
committing crimes, but treating those who commit crimes as defined by the 
legislature differently than those who do not is not a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Prohibiting the State of Idaho from treating those who break 
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law differently from those who do not, as advocated by Rome, render 
entirety of the criminal law void. 
Rome also complains that Idaho's burglary statute is an "anomaly" among 
the states and asserts "no explanation can be given for why [he] deserves to be 
made a felon under I.C. § 18-1401 when the woman he was convicted of aiding 
and abetting did not even complete a successful attempted theft under I.C. § 18-
306." (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) Rome then engages in an extended 
discussion of why he does not believe the objectives of sentencing support 
classifying burglary as a felony, at least in the context of "shoplifting." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.) Rome's argument is long on hyperbole, but short 
on logic and law. Whether Idaho's burglary statute is an "anomaly" has no 
bearing on whether the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. Rome's 
complaints about his felony status also ultimately have no bearing on his Equal 
Protection claim because his claim does not survive the first step of the 
analysis-the existence of a suspect classification-which would require the 
Court to engage in analysis of whether the classification passes constitutional 
muster under the applicable standard. 
That Rome is not advocating an actual equal protection legal standard is 
further shown by his failure to identify what level of scrutiny he thinks would apply 
to his equal protection claim. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp. 10-19.) It is 
well-established that "[d]ifferent levels of scrutiny apply to equal protection 
challenges." State v. Doe, 155 Idaho 99, 104, 305 P.3d 543, 548 (Ct. App. 
2013). "[S]trict scrutiny applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes; 
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intermediate scrutiny applies classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; 
rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges." (citation omitted). 
"For analyses made under the Idaho Constitution, slightly different levels of 
scrutiny apply." kl Rather than identifying and discussing any applicable equal 
protection standard, Rome seems to advocate for substituting a "cruel and 
unusual" framework for review under the mistaken belief that the analyses are 
"similar." (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.) Clearly they are not Cruel and unusual 
punishment claims arise out of the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and Article I, Section 6 
ofhe Idaho Constitution, and involve consideration of evolving standards of 
decency. See State v. Abdullah, _ Idaho _, 348 P.3d 1, 70-71 (2015). 
Unlike equal protection analysis, cruel and unusual punishment analysis does not 
involve consideration of suspect classes and varying degrees of scrutiny based 
on those classifications. Ultimately the legal standard advocated by Rome 
applies to neither equal protection nor cruel and unusual punishment, and is 
merely advanced as a mechanism to invite this Court to invade the legislative 
province of defining crimes. 
Because it is not based on actual legal standards governing equal 
protection or cruel and unusual punishment claims, Rome's equal protection and 
cruel and unusual punishment arguments are meritless. 
2. Prohibiting Burglary Does Not Implicate Freedom Of Speech 
Rome's First Amendment claim also fails. "As a general matter, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
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because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. 2543 (2012) (quotations, brackets, and ,..,,+...,t,,.,..., 
omitted). Thus, content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid 
and will not be upheld unless the government can demonstrate the restrictions 
comport with the constitution. kt at 2544. These principles are not threatened 
by I.C. § 18-1401 because Idaho's burglary statute does not prohibit any speech, 
much less speech "because of its message, its subject matter, or its content." 
The burglary statute prohibits the act of entering specified places with the mental 
state of intent to commit any theft or any felony. I. C. § 18-1401. The plain 
language of the statute defeats any claim that it prohibits any sort of speech. 
Undeterred by the plain language of the statute, Rome argues that it 
prohibits "thought crimes" and "chill[s] speech and thought." (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 17, 20.) It is unclear what "speech" Rome believes was punished in his case. 
Rome's argument is that "intention" has been "bootstrap[ped]" to "an innocent 
action," and appears to depend on an implicit premise that "intention" is 
synonymous with "speech and thought." (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-20.) His 
apparent belief that criminal intent is speech, and therefore falls within the ambit 
of First Amendment protections, is frivolous. 
Rome's argument that criminal intent is a form of protected speech 
primarily relies on cases that have nothing to do with speech. For example, 
Rome, citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and Justice Ginsburg's 
dissent in United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998), writes: "It has long been 
the stance of this nation that an actus reus is required for a crime, and that 
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'thought crime' is impossible in a civilized society and under 
Amendment." (Appellant's brief, p. 17.) Rome also writes: 
Mere intentions alone cannot make a crime. See Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that an 
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no 
provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in 
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose 
between good and evil[.]"). 
(Appellant's brief, p. 17.) This analysis is deeply flawed. 
The state agrees that crimes at least generally require a union of act and 
intent. State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 670, 862 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Ct. App. 
1993). The burglary statute complies with that requirement because it requires 
both an act and a criminal intent. The burglary statute does not penalize thought, 
as Rome suggests. Further, that Rome thinks the act-entry into a defined 
space-is "not a substantial step toward anything," is irrelevant. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 18-19.) The Supreme Court's opinions in Robinson, Balsys, and 
Morissette do not shed any light on the merits of Rome's First Amendment claim 
because the cases have nothing to do with the First Amendment. The Court in 
Robinson held that a California statute that made it a crime "to be addicted to the 
use of narcotics" inflicted cruel and unusual punishment. 370 U.S. 660. Balsys 
is a Fifth Amendment case in which the Court held that "concern with foreign 
prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause." 524 U.S. at 
669. And, in Morrissette, the Court held that criminal intent is an essential 
element of the crime of conversion of Government property, which must be 
decided by a jury, and the trial court in that case erred by instructing the jury 
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otherwise. 342 U.S. 246. None of these cases supports Rome's claim of a 
Amendment violation. 
Finally, to the extent Rome thinks it would be better, and perhaps more 
constitutional, if the burglary statute read "for the purpose of' instead of "with 
intent to," such an argument does not establish a First Amendment violation. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-20 (quoting a discussion from United States v. 
Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3rd Cir. 2006), on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b), which prohibits traveling to another state for the purpose of engaging in 
an unlawful sexual act, and "not[ing] that I.C. § 18-1401 does not contain the 'for 
the purpose of provision saving it from constitutional impropriety").) There is no 
meaningful distinction between the two phrases, much less a distinction that is 
relevant to Rome's First Amendment argument. 
Like his equal protection argument, Rome's First Amendment argument is 
meritless. Rome has failed to show any error in the district court's denial of is 
motion to dismiss. 
11. 
Rome Has Failed To Show That The Persistent Violator Enhancement Does Not 
Apply To Him 
A. Introduction 
Rome moved for an acquittal on the persistent violator enhancement, 
contending that he never had a chance to rehabilitate between prior felony 
convictions because judgments on the prior convictions were entered the same 
day. (R., pp. 138-46, 149-50; Tr., p. 156, L. 14 - p. 159, L. 7.) The district court 
denied the motion. (R., p. 153; Tr., p. 178, L. 23 - p. 183, L. 12.) Rome argues 
10 
on appeal that district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21 1 
argument fails because it is contrary to the applicable statutory language. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Rome Is A Persistent Violator 
"When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of a statute, 
which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. Craven, 154 
Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation 
omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative history 
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ). See 
also Stringer v. Robinson, 155 Idaho 554, 558, 314 P.3d 609, 613 (2013) (court 
"not at liberty to disregard the plain language of the Idaho Code"). An ambiguity 
is not created merely because "two different interpretations of a statute are 
presented," but a statute is ambiguous only where the "meaning is so doubtful or 
obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." 
Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 
622, 625 (2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, legislative intent, 
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including the analysis of the 
whole act at issue." !sl 
language, "should be derived 
and citation omitted). 
a reading of 
The statute at issue reads, in relevant part "Any person convicted for the 
third time of the commission of a felony . . . shall be considered a persistent 
violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term ... [of] 
not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life." LC. § 19-2514. 
The state presented evidence that Rome was convicted of more than two 
felonies prior to this case, and of course he was convicted of a felony in this case 
as well. (Exhibits, pp. 2-51; R., p. 111.) Under the plain language of the statute 
he was a "person convicted for the third time" and therefore a "persistent 
violator." 
Because he entered his guilty pleas to the four previous felonies on one 
day (Exhibits, pp. 4, 21, 38) and was sentenced on those prior convictions on 
one day (Exhibits, pp. 14, 31, 48), Rome, citing State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 
715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1986), contends that the persistent violator statute does 
not apply to him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-30.) Application of the relevant legal 
standards shows this claim to be meritless. 
In Brandt the defendant was convicted of escape while in custody after 
pleading guilty to three other felonies. The court summarized the three prior 
felony convictions as follows: "Each was the result of a separate crime" arising 
from three different burglaries at different homes "during a two month period"; 
each was charged in "a separate information filed on a different day"; and Brandt 
"pied guilty to all the charges" on one day and "was sentenced" for all three on 
12 
another day. Brandt, 110 Idaho at 343, 715 P.2d at 1013. The Court of Appeals 
set forth the applicable law as follows: 
Generally, we agree with the majority [of courts to consider the 
issue] that convictions entered the same day or charged in the 
same information should count as a single conviction for purposes 
of establishing habitual offender status. However, the nature of the 
convictions in any given situation must be examined to make 
certain that the general rule is appropriate. 
kh at 344, 715 P.3d at 1014. Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that "Brandt fits well within the scope of I.C. § 19-2514." kh 
This case is indistinguishable from Brandt.2 The first felony at issue was 
forgery on the bank account of the Snohomish County Young Republicans, 
committed on February 12, 2007, and charged on September 11, 2007. 
(Exhibits, p. 36.) The second felony at issue was forgery on the bank account of 
Marni Mead and Leonard Hoopaw committed on March 14, 2007, and charged 
by information filed on June 6, 2007. (Exhibits, p. 2.) The third felony at issue 
started as single count of robbery, charged on May 16, 2007, but was amended 
to third degree assault of Ed Coleman and grand theft from Home Depot 
committed on April 14, 2007 (Exhibits, pp. 17, 19.) As in Brandt, "[t]he three 
offenses here were charged in three separate informations and each charge 
2 The state notes that the court in Brandt did not engage in any analysis of the 
statutory language. Nothing in the statutory language of I.C. § 19-2514 suggests 
that Rome is entitled to even have the fact his guilty pleas and judgments were 
entered on the same day considered in relation to whether he is a "persistent 
violator." The implicit assumption in Brandt, that the legislature contemplated 
only post-conviction-of-a-felony rehabilitation and did not intend pre-conviction-
of-a-felony deterrence, is simply unwarranted under the plain language of the 
statute. Regardless, the statute clearly applies under circumstances such as 
presented in this case, where the defendant commits three or more felonies that 
are clearly separate and distinct in all respects. 
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represented a separate crime occurring in a separate location with a separate 
" Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344, 715 P.3d at 1014. See also State v. Smith, 
6 Idaho 553, 559-60, 777 P.2d 1226, 1232-33 (Ct. App. 1989) (convictions for 
"distinguishable incidents of criminal conduct" properly treated as "evidence of 
multiple prior felonies"). 
On appeal Rome argues "there are two theories as to what the general 
rule intends-a mechanical theory, and a Due Process theory," and advocates 
application of the latter. (Appellant's brief, p. 28.) He claims the due process 
theory is "a constitutional ban on increasing the penalty on a felony to life where 
a defendant has not been given the chance from his last felony conviction to 
rehabilitate having had notice of the enhanced penalties." (Appellant's brief, pp. 
29-30.) This argument enjoys no legal support. Rome claims a "Due Process 
theory" was employed in State v. Saviers, 156 Idaho 324, 325 P.3d 665 (Ct. App. 
2014) (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23, 28), but the phrase "due process" appears 
nowhere in the opinion. The phrase "due process" is also absent from the other 
cases cited by Rome which involve application of LC. §19-2514, to wit State v. 
Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 715 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1986), State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 
337, 971 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1998), State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 990 
P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999), State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903,994 P.2d 1066 (Ct. App. 
2000), and State v. Self, 139 Idaho 718, 85 P.3d 1117 (Ct. App. 2003), and due 
process is discussed in State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 777 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 
1989), only in relation to other claims. (Compare Appellant's brief, pp. 22-28 
(citing cases addressing persistent violator enhancement).) Because Rome has 
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cited no legal authority directly or indirectly supporting his claim that there is a 
process theory" creating a "ban" on increasing penalty for a 
offender who has not had multiple opportunities for rehabilitation, this argument 
is waived. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, Inc., 156 Idaho 696, 706, 330 P.3d 
1054, 1064 (2014) (appellate issue waived by failing to provide "pertinent 
authority or argument"); State v. Boehm, 158 Idaho 294, , 346 P.3d 311,318 
(Ct. App. 2015) (claims must be supported by cogent argument and legal 
authority to be considered on appeal). Even if the lack of legal support does not 
result in waiver, such complete lack of relevant authority renders the argument 
specious. 
Rome's prior felonies, committed at different times, charged in separate 
informations, and involving different victims, were distinguishable incidents of 
criminal conduct for purposes of application of the persistent violator statute. 
Rome's argument that there is a "Due Process theory" "ban" on considering the 
three convictions as three convictions is specious. He has therefore failed to 
show error in the finding he is a persistent violator. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2015. 
KENNETH K. JORG 
Deputy Attorney Ge~ r 
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